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I.  Introduction 
The United Nations (“UN”) has dubbed the humanitarian crisis 
in Yemen the worst human crisis in the world.1  Tens of thousands 
of people have died in the ongoing war2 and from the outbreak of 
deadly diseases.3  About half of Yemen’s population is in dire need 
of humanitarian aid,4 millions of people have been internally 
displaced,5 hundreds of thousands of refugees have migrated to 
other countries,6 children have been recruited as child soldiers,7 and 
the illegal use of mines and cluster bombs has put at risk the lives 
of many more.8 
 
 1 GIULIO COPPI, THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN YEMEN: BEYOND THE MAN-MADE 
DISASTER, INT’L PEACE INST. 6 (Albert Trithart & Madeline Brennan, eds., 2018), 
https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/IPI-Rpt-Humanitarian-Crisis-in-
Yemen.pdf [hereinafter Coppi] [https://perma.cc/BX8F-JNLL]. 
 2 Int’l Crisis Grp., Crisis Group Yemen Update #7 (Mar. 8, 2017), 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-
peninsula/yemen/crisis-group-yemen-update-7 [https://perma.cc/CV4R-8AF8]. 
 3 Stephanie Nebehay, World Has Just Months to Stop Starvation in Yemen, Somalia: 
Red Cross, REUTERS (Mar. 22, 2017, 6:16 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-
hunger/world-has-just-months-to-stop-starvation-in-yemen-somalia-red-cross-
idUSKBN16T132 [https://perma.cc/ J28U-RVKT]. 
 4 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA], Yemen,  29 
HUMANITARIAN BULL. (Nov. 20, 2017) 
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1418542/1788_1511878299_yemen.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/32NZ-BXXZ]. 
 5 TASK FORCE ON POPULATION MOVEMENT, YEMEN: 16TH REPORT 4 (Oct. 2017), 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/tfpm_16th_report_oct2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JQ6C-GMET]. 
 6 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees [UNHCR], Yemen Situation: Regional Refugee 
and Migration Response Plan Overview (Jan.-Dec. 2016), 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/32372 [https://perma.cc/6CBP-R45A]. 
 7 See Coppi, supra note 1, at 6–7. 
 8 See id. 
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The crisis started when the Houthi rebels ousted the existing 
government to seize power and governmental control.9  The Hadi 
government asked its allies to save it from the crisis,10 and so the 
war between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis began, 
resulting in this humanitarian crisis.  Therefore, to understand what 
factors acted to fuel the crisis, this Article is an attempt to explore 
the underlying realities that led to this situation.  In doing so, this 
Article will explore the key players in the war and the events in the 
fight in Yemen that shaped this crisis, while discussing the 
humanitarian situation.  Parties will be divided into two groups: one 
is the state-centric group acting on behalf of the Yemeni 
government, and the other is the anti-state group acting against the 
Yemeni government’s interest.  Moreover, this Article will also 
attempt to investigate the legality of the use of force by all parties 
to this conflict, to be able to conclude who is using legitimate force 
and who is using illegitimate force in Yemen, in accordance with 
international law.  Then, this Article will analyze the conduct of 
both parties using force to comprehend the violations of 
international humanitarian and human rights laws in the Yemeni 
conflict. 
For these reasons, this Article is divided into eight parts.  Part II 
will explain the background that led to this armed conflict between 
the Saudi-led coalition/Hadi government and the Houthis.  Part III 
will classify the key players in this conflict into two categories: 
those acting for the Hadi government and those supporting the 
Houthi rebels or acting against the interests of the Yemeni 
government.  Part IV will explore the legitimacy of using force in 
Yemen. For this, Part IV will analyze the international law of 
consent to use force in the host state and will list nations’ formal 
positions regarding the legitimacy of using force in Yemen.  Part V 
 
 9 Int’l Comm’n of Jurists, Bearing the Brunt of War in Yemen: International Law 
Violations and Their Impact on the Civilian Population 3 (July 2018), 
http://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Yemen-War-impact-on-populations-
Advocacy-Analysis-Brief-2018-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JEB-DJNT] [hereinafter 
Bearing the Brunt]. 
 10 Luca Ferro & Tom Ruys, The Saudi-led Military Intervention in Yemen’s Civil 
War—2015, in THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CASE-BASED APPROACH 899, 
900 (Tom Ruys et al. eds., 2018) [hereinafter Ferro & Ruys].  See also U.N. Security 
Council [SCOR], Letters dated 26 March 2015 from the Permanent Representative of 
Qatar to the U.N. Addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security 
Council, 3-5, U.N. Doc. S/2015/217 (Mar. 27, 2015) [hereinafter U.N.S.C. Qatar Letters]. 
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will enquire whether the nature of this conflict is international or 
non-international to be able to identify which rules and laws are 
applicable to the Yemeni conflict.  Part VI will elaborate on the 
humanitarian crisis in Yemen, supported by statistics on damages, 
casualties, people in need of humanitarian aid, outbreaks of disease, 
and migration crises.  Part VII will evaluate the applicable human 
rights laws and international humanitarian laws in Yemen to 
perceive the violations of these laws by both parties to this conflict.  
Part VII will further examine the laws and conduct of both parties 
regarding arms transfer, arbitrary detentions, and counterterrorism 
activities in Yemen.  Part VIII concludes. 
II. Background 
The Yemeni government and the Houthis have been in an armed 
conflict since 2004.11  The Houthis are a group of nonstate actors 
(NSAs), specifically a Zaidi Shia rebel group established in 1990, 
with the aim of gaining political power in the country and 
eradicating the Saudi-backed Salafi influence in the region.12  The 
conflict began after then-president Ali Abdullah Saleh used heavy 
security measures to arrest the leader of the Houthi rebellion in an 
effort to curtail insurgencies in the country.13  After the Arab Spring 
hit Yemen in 2011, the Houthi rebellion gained a stronghold and 
initiated months-long protests against the government in the name 
of fighting corruption and the U.S.-backed dictator, in the end 
forcing the president out of office.14  The government was handed 
over to Saleh’s deputy, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, who was elected 
president in the 2012 election.15  From 2012 to 2014, Yemen faced 
intense political instability due to widespread protests against fuel 
prices in the Houthi stronghold regions.16  Within a few months, the 
 
 11 See Bearing the Brunt, supra note 9, at 3. 
 12 Who Are the Houthis?, TRT WORLD (Dec. 18, 2018), 
https://www.trtworld.com/middle-east/who-are-the-houthis-22592 
[https://perma.cc/X5YU-GY92] [hereinafter Houthis]. 
 13 Non-International Armed Conflicts in Yemen, RULAC GENEVA ACAD. 
(last updated May 14, 2019), http://www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/non-international-
armed-conflicts-in-yemen [https://perma.cc/7DXA-ECPG] [hereinafter Non-International 
Armed Conflicts]. 
 14 Houthis, supra note 12. 
 15 Bearing the Brunt, supra note 9, at 3. 
 16 Id. 
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Houthis managed to gain control of the capital city, Sana’a.17  The 
government negotiated with the Houthis and reached a temporary 
peace agreement brokered by the UN, which only lasted a few 
months, until the contested constitutional draft in January 2015.18  
Within a month, the Houthis took over the president’s residence and 
forced him to resign.19  They announced their assumption of power 
in Yemen after gaining control of the armed forces, fighter planes, 
and ammunition.20  In March 2015, President Hadi moved to the city 
of Aden and declared it the new capital in the hope of regaining 
control.21  However, when the country faced major protests on both 
sides, President Hadi fled to Saudi Arabia and invited neighboring 
countries to intervene by force.22  As a result, a nine-member 
coalition, comprising Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, and 
Sudan, commenced Operation Decisive Storm,23 which initiated 
armed conflict between the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis.  In 
April 2015, the United Nations Security Council adopted 
Resolution 2216 and recognized President Hadi as the legitimate 
president of Yemen.24  The arms embargo against the Houthis has 
been in place since February 2014.25 
 
 17 Id. 
 18 SARI ARRAF, THE WAR REPORT 2017: THE ARMED CONFLICT IN YEMEN: A 




 19 See id. 
 20 See Bearing the Brunt, supra note 9, at 3. 
 21 See id. 
 22 U.N.S.C. Qatar Letters, supra note 10, at 3.  See also S.C. Res. 2216 (Apr. 14, 
2015). 
 23 ARRAF, supra note 18, at 5.  See also Oona Hathaway et al., The Yemen Crisis and 
the Law: The Saudi-Led Campaign and U.S. Involvement, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 20, 2018), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/52718/js-yemen-crisis-forum-saudi-campaign-us-
involvement/ [https://perma.cc/TC6P-BSJ4].  See also Helene Cooper et al., Army Special 
Forces Secretly Help Saudis Combat Threat from Yemen Rebels, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/03/us/politics/green-berets-saudi-yemen-
border-houthi.html [https://perma.cc/3VHK-8NFS].  See also Non-International Armed 
Conflicts, supra note 13. 
 24 ARRAF, supra note 18, at 5. 
 25 See S.C. Res. 2216, ¶ 14 (Apr. 14, 2015); see also S.C. Res. 2140 (Feb. 26, 2014); 
S.C. Res. 2266 (Feb. 24, 2016); S.C. Res. 2342 (Feb. 23, 2017); S.C. Res. 2402 (Feb. 26, 
2018). 
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In 2016, UAE ground troops forced Al Qaeda out of Mukalla,26 
where Saleh and the Houthi forces had concluded an agreement to 
form the Supreme Political Council.27  In 2017, the Houthis killed 
former president Saleh for calling upon Saudi Arabia to negotiate28 
for peace and stability in the country.  Currently, the present Yemeni 
government is increasingly losing control over its territory to the 
UAE-backed movement, Al Qaeda, ISIS, and other NSA/terrorist 
groups in the region.29  The UAE supported movements for the 
autonomy of provinces, for which Hadi forces have condemned 
certain UAE-backed movements.30 
As the UAE and the U.S. accuse Iran31 and North Korea of 
providing arms and missile technology to the Houthis, Iran 
categorically denies these accusations.32  In 2017, Operation Golden 
Arrow was initiated by the Saudi-led coalition to cut off Houthi 
 
 26 Thomas Joscelyn, Arab Coalition Enters AQAP Stronghold in Port City of 
Mukalla, Yemen, FDD’S LONG WAR J. (Apr. 25, 2016), 
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/04/arab-coalition-enters-aqap-stronghold-
in-port-city-of-mukalla-yemen.php [https://perma.cc/7T24-NWTH]. 
 27 U.N. Sec. Council, Final Rep. of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. 
S/2017/81 (Jan. 31, 2017). 
 28 April Longley Alley, The Killing of Former President Saleh Could Worsen 
Yemen’s War, INT’L CRISIS GROUP (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-
east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/killing-former-president-saleh-
could-worsen-yemen-war [https://perma.cc/U46G-4A7N]. 
 29 See Peter Beaumont, ‘Scores’ Killed in Yemen as UAE-backed Fighters Seize 
Parts of Aden, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 14, 2019, 11:13 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/aug/14/scores-killed-in-yemen-
as-uae-backed-fighters-seize-parts-of-aden [https://perma.cc/ABB3-6BAJ]; see also 
Sudarsan Raghavan, With the ISIS Caliphate Defeated in Syria, an Islamist Militant 





 30 Yemen at the UN – April 2017 Review, SANA’A CTR. FOR STRATEGIC STUD. (May 
8, 2017), https://sanaacenter.org/publications/yemen-at-the-un/99 
[https://perma.cc/MT5N-B7B7] [hereinafter Yemen at the UN].  See also Stephen A. 
Seche, Shaping the South: The UAE in Yemen, ARAB GULF STATES INST. IN WASH. (May 
4, 2017), https://agsiw.org/shaping-south-uae-yemen/ [https://perma.cc/7ZGY-7WQ3]. 
 31 See U.N. Sec. Council, Final Rep. of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, ¶ 111, U.N. 
Doc. S/2018/68 (Jan. 26, 2018). 
 32 Iran Denies U.S. Allegations of Arms Supply to Yemen Houthis, XINHUA NET (Dec. 
1, 2018), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-12/01/c_137644470.htm 
[https://perma.cc/JF2J-YAG2] [hereinafter Iran Denies U.S. Allegations]. 
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supply lines.33  As a result, within a few months, Hadi forces had 
managed to gain control of the port of Mocha.34 
III. Key Players 
The key players in the Yemeni armed conflict are categorized 
into two main categories in this Article: anti-state actors and state 
actors.  State actors have authority to use force in the Yemeni armed 
conflict, and nonstate/anti-state actors have no such legitimate basis 
under international law.  Section A will list the anti-state actors, and 
Section B will list the state actors in the Yemeni armed conflict. 
A. Anti-state Actors 
This Article identifies Houthis, Al Qaeda, ISIS, and Hezbollah 
as the anti-state actors working against or without the legal authority 
of the Yemeni government.  Moreover, in some instances, it also 
discusses activities undertaken by Iran and the United States against 
Yemen’s interest or without Yemen’s consent in the sovereign 
territory of Yemen. 
1. Houthis  
The Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, are a Zaidi Shia rebel 
group using force in Yemen.35  They are nonstate actors, but claimed 
the presidency in 2017 and assumed control of the government in 
Yemen.36  The Houthis had been in armed conflict with the Saleh 
regime since 2004, but later joined forces with Saleh’s forces in 
2014 to gain control of the capital;37 they are also responsible for 
killing former president Saleh in 2017.38  The Houthis comprise 
militant groups and several military units with Zaidi and Sayyid 
 
 33 OPERATION GOLDEN ARROW: THE PROSPECTS FOR A RESOLUTION TO THE YEMENI 




 34 Gulf-Backed Yemeni Forces Capture Red Sea Coast City, REUTERS (Feb. 7, 2017, 
3:54 PM), https://af.reuters.com/article/africaTech/idAFL5N1FS71O 
[https://perma.cc/762U-WJP5]. 
 35 ARRAF, supra note 18, at 8. 
 36 See id. at 8–9. 
 37 See id. 
 38 Id. 
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backgrounds.39  The Houthis control most of the major cities in 
Yemen, including Sana’a, Al Mahwit, Raymah, Damar, Hajjah, 
Amran, Saada, Al bayda, and Ibb.40  Presently, the U.S. is 
considering characterizing the Houthis as a terrorist group.41 
2. Al Qaeda and ISIS 
Al Qaeda has gained a presence in several parts of Yemen since 
2011, after the political vacuum created by the Houthis.42  This 
group comprises a sub-branch of Al Qaeda known as Ansar al-
Sharia.43  It has a presence in the areas of Abyn, Aden, Balhaf, 
Mukalla, and Ash Shihr.44  Al Qaeda aims to expand its territorial 
control;45 however, Al Qaeda and the Houthis are in armed conflict 
with each other to secure their different interests.46  Similarly, since 
2014, ISIS has also gained influence in certain parts of Yemen 
owing to the political vacuum.47  Yet ISIS has less presence in 
Yemen than Al Qaeda, and it targets mosques and government 
institutes in its attacks.48 
3. Iran 
The Saudi-led coalition blames Iran for supporting and arming 
 
 39 U.N. Sec. Council, Final Rep. of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, at 3, U.N. Doc. 
S/2017/81 (Jan. 31, 2017). 
 40 Ali Chugtai & Faisal Edroos, Yemen Conflict: Who Controls What, AL-JAZEERA 
(Mar. 24, 2019, 3:02 PM), https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2016/08/yemen-
conflict-controls-160814132104300.html [https://perma.cc/X42G-CYMQ] [hereinafter 
Chugtai & Edroos]. 
 41 Missy Ryan, Trump Administration Considers Naming Yemen’s Houthi Rebels a 




 42 ARRAF, supra note 18, at 9. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Chugtai & Edroos, supra note 40. 
 45 DYLAN O’DRISCOLL, VIOLENT EXTREMIST ORGANISATIONS IN YEMEN, K4D 
HELPDESK 4 (June 25, 2018), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5b6db3aded915d6d132f26dd/Violent_extr
emist_organisations_in_Yemen.pdf [https://perma.cc/N92Y-YNAR]. 
 46 See id. at 4. 
 47 See id. at 2. 
 48 See id. 
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the Houthis.  Iran categorically denies any involvement.49  There are 
claims, nonetheless, that Iran has been providing training and arms 
to Houthis through Hezbollah.50  The UN is of the view that there is 
no large-scale Iranian involvement or support for the Houthis.51  
Above all, there is a paranoia that Houthis are Iranian-backed Shia.52  
However, the Zaidi Shias are different from the Twelver Shias in 
Iran.53  In a UN report, the Panel of Experts found that the weapons 
materials and technology used by the Houthis were manufactured in 
or derived from Iran.54 
4. Hezbollah 
The Houthis are not dependent on Iran for financial and arms 
support.55  Hezbollah is the Houthis’ chief ally in Lebanon.56  
Hezbollah provides the necessary training and arms support to the 
Houthis.57  A Hezbollah commander said in an interview that “after 
we are done with Syria, we will start with Yemen, Hezbollah is 
already there.  . . . Who do you think fires Tochka Missiles in Saudi 
Arabia? It’s not Houthis in their sandals, it’s us.”58 
 
 49 Iran Denies U.S. Allegations, supra note 32. 
 50 FAREA AL-MUSLIMI, IRAN’S ROLE IN YEMEN EXAGGERATED, BUT DESTRUCTIVE, 
CENTURY FOUND. (May 29, 2017), https://production-
tcf.imgix.net/app/uploads/2017/05/03104439/irans-role-in-yemen-exaggerated-but-
destructive.pdf [https://perma.cc/B877-97PN].  See Mareike Transfeld, Iran’s Small Hand 
in Yemen, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Feb. 14, 2017), 
https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/67988 [https://perma.cc/E2JA-NRKG]. 
 51 Rep. of the S.C., Letter Dated 5 February 2018 from the Permanent Representative 
of Saudi Arabia to the U.N. Addressed to the President of the Sec. Council, ¶ 62, U.N. 
Doc. S/2018/93 (Feb. 6, 2017). 
 52 See ARRAF, supra note 18, at 10. 
 53 Id. 
 54 See Final Rep. of the Panel of Experts on Yemen (2018), transmitted by Letter 
dated 26 January 2018 Mandated by Security Council Resolution 2342 (2017) Addressed 
to the President of the Security Council, ¶ 96, U.N. Doc. S/2018/68 (Jan. 26, 2018). 
 55 JEREMY M. SHARP, CONG. RES. SERV., YEMEN: CIVIL WAR AND REGIONAL 
INTERVENTION 9 (2018) [hereinafter SHARP]. 
 56 See id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Alexander Corbeil & Amarnath Amarasingam, The Houthi Hezbollah: Iran’s 
Train-and-Equip Program in Sanaa, FOREIGN AFF. (Mar. 31, 2016), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-03-31/houthi-hezbollah 
[https://perma.cc/EM6Y-Q72R]. See also SHARP, supra note 55, at 9. 
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5. United States 
The U.S. has been conducting drone strikes in different regions 
of Yemen against Al Qaeda and other suspected terrorists since 
Saleh’s era, and continues to do so.59  The Yemeni government 
rejected U.S. authority to use drone strikes in the sovereign territory 
of Yemen.60  In response, the UN acknowledged that the drone 
strikes by the U.S. do not adhere to the principles of international 
humanitarian law.61  In 2017, the Hadi government again formally 
asked the U.S. government to stop its use of force against suspected 
terrorists in the sovereign territory of Yemen.62 
B. State Actors  
State actors are parties to the Yemeni conflict that use force with 
the legal authority of the Yemeni government; these actors include 
the Hadi government (which is recognized by the UN as the 
legitimate government of Yemen), the Saleh forces (which have 
joined the Hadi forces in the fight against the Houthis), and the 
Saudi-led coalition (which initiated intervention in Yemen against 
the Houthis, upon the request of the Hadi government).63 
1. Hadi Government 
Most of the military groups under the command of Ali Mohsin 
are loyal to the present president, Hadi, whereas only a few military 
units have joined forces with the Saleh forces and the Houthis.64  
The Hadi forces comprise most of Yemen’s military forces and 
tribal forces.65  The Hadi forces are also in charge of the Hadrami 
Elite forces, which are operating under the UAE’s control.66  Since 
 
 59 See ARRAF, supra note 18, at 9. 
 60 ALKARAMA FOUNDATION, U.S. DRONE STRIKES IN YEMEN (2019), 
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/USA/INT_CCPR_CS
S_USA_16494_E.pdf [https://perma.cc/H3Q3-L8B8] [hereinafter ALKARAMA]. 
 61 Id. 
 62 See ARRAF, supra note 18, at 9. 
 63 Id. at 8–9. 
 64 See id. at 9. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Permanent Rep. of Burundi to the U.N., Letter dated March 6, 2017 from the 
Permanent Rep. of Somalia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, ¶ 312, U.N. Doc. S/2017/193 (Mar. 6, 2017).  See ARRAF, supra note 18, at 9; 
Ryan Goodman & Alex Moorehead, UAE, a Key US Partner in Yemen, Implicated in 
Detainee Abuse, JUST SECURITY (May 15, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/40978/uae-
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2017, the Hadi government has had an alliance with the Saudi-led 
coalition and Saleh’s loyal forces.67  The Hadi government has a 
force presence in the areas of Marib, Shabwa, Lahij, Al Mahrah, 
Hodeidah, and Al Jawf.68 
2. Saleh Forces 
The Saleh forces comprise tribal, political, and military forces 
that are still loyal to the deceased former president Saleh.69  These 
forces continue to have certain influence in the major regions of 
Yemen.70  The Saleh forces have joined the Hadi forces in the fight 
against the Houthis since 2017.71 
3. Saudi-Led Coalition 
In 2015, the Saudi-led coalition began the use of force in Yemen 
upon invitation from President Hadi with the aim of ousting the 
Houthi rebellion in the country and gaining control for the 
legitimate government of President Hadi.72  The coalition was 
initially comprised of nine members, including Saudi Arabia, the 
UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Sudan, and 
Qatar.73  But, owing to Qatar’s diplomatic crises in 2017, Qatar had 
to leave the coalition.74  Recently, Morocco has also desired to leave 
the coalition.75  The operations are mainly led by Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE, whose agendas seem to diverge from one another at 
occasions.76  Saudi Arabia controls the air operations from its 
headquarters in Riyadh77 and retains power to control ground 
 
key-partner-yemen-implicated-detainee-abuse/ [https://perma.cc/9X7G-Z3BU]. 
 67 See ARRAF, supra note 18, at 8–9. 
 68 Chugtai & Edroos, supra note 40. 
 69 See ARRAF, supra note 18, at 8. 
 70 See id. 
 71 See id. at 8–9. 
 72 See id. at 9. 
 73 See id. at 9. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Amira El Masaiti, Morocco Re-Evaluates Role in Saudi-led Yemen War Coalition, 
WASH. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2019), 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/feb/7/morocco-freezes-involvement-in-
saudi-led-coalition/ [https://perma.cc/B37K-TTHE]. 
 76 See ARRAF, supra note 18, at 9. 
 77 Final Rep. of the Panel of Experts on Yemen (2017), transmitted by Letter dated 
27 January 2017 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen Addressed to the President of the 
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operations in Marib, whereas the UAE controls ground operations 
in Aden and in the areas around Mukalla.78 
i. United States (U.S.) 
After establishing the coalition, Saudi Arabia sought U.S. 
military support.79  President Obama authorized logistical and 
intelligence support to the Saudi-led coalition in 2015.80  Since then, 
the U.S. has been supplying weapons to Saudi Arabia for the use of 
force in Yemen and has signed weapon sales deals running into the 
hundreds of billions of dollars, and Saudi Arabia has been found on 
several occasions to be in violation of international humanitarian 
law in Yemen.81  The U.S. also supplies air refueling for coalition 
jets for airstrikes in Yemen.82 
ii. United Kingdom and France 
The United Kingdom and France83 have been providing arms to 
the Saudi Arabian-led coalition for the use of force in Yemen 
despite the coalition’s violations of International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL).84  The UK has sold arms worth more than £3.3 billion to 
Saudi Arabia, and the UK High Court also ruled in July 2017 that 
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arms sale to Saudi Arabia was lawful.85  The UK and France train 
Saudi-led coalition pilots and oversee their operations from their 
headquarters in Riyadh.86 
IV. Use of Force 
The Houthis took control of missiles when they took over the 
capital city, Sana’a.87  Since 2016, the Houthis have been firing 
these missiles, which have a range of 500–620 miles, into the 
sovereign territory of Saudi Arabia.88  In November 2017, when the 
Houthis fired longer-range Burkan-2H missiles targeting the 
populated cities of Saudi Arabia, the U.S. concluded that the 
missiles used had Iranian technology.89  Since the Houthis had not 
used such technology before this incident, the U.S. concluded that 
Iran had supported the Houthis.90  The UN acknowledged that the 
missiles had a technology similar to that possessed by Iran, and that 
it is probable that they had been manufactured abroad.91  Saudi 
Arabia has also successfully intercepted a missile fired by the 
Houthis that was targeted to destroy Makkah, which is the holiest 
place for Muslims worldwide.92 
The Houthis took over the capital city, Sana’a, and major 
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institutes of the government,93 and unlawfully ousted the legitimate 
Hadi government.94  In addition, the Houthis continue to use lethal 
force against protesters,95 while also using civilians as human 
shields.96  They have captured, tortured, and murdered hostages,97 
bombed and shelled civilians including children,98 kidnapped 
journalists,99  and killed the former president, Saleh.100  Houthis have 
captured coastlines, have been targeting foreign ships, endangering 
maritime security,101 and have fired more than 100 missiles in the 
sovereign territory of Saudi Arabia.102  In sum, they have destroyed 
Yemen by initiating and conducting civil war against their own 
state, overthrown a government in a coup, taken over the capital, 
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Sana’a, killed the former president,103 killed civilians, attacked other 
states by sea and land, and successfully disturbed the peace and 
security of not only Yemen, but the whole region. 
In response, the present legitimate Hadi government invited its 
regional allies to restore the governmental mandate and peace in the 
region.104  As a result, the Saudi-led government has initiated several 
operations to recover control of Yemen’s shores and governmental 
institutions, including but not limited to Operation Decisive 
Storm105 and Operation Golden Arrow106 in 2015.  This intervention 
and civilian war between the Houthis and the Hadi 
government/Saudi-led coalition has created the worst humanitarian 
crisis in the world, according to UN reports,107 killing thousands of 
civilians108 and creating a food and health crisis among Yemen’s 
population.109 
A. Invitation/Consent 
The use of force in other states is prohibited by the UN 
Charter;110 the only exceptions are the use of force in self-defense111 
and the use of force with UN Security Council authorization.112  Iran 
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has accused Saudi Arabia of using force in Yemen as an unlawful 
international intervention in Yemen’s sovereign territory.113  In 
response, Saudi Arabia claims that the legitimate government of 
Yemen is the Hadi government, referring to the UN’s statements, 
and that this legitimate government has invited Saudi Arabia to use 
force in Yemen to restore order and peace to counter the illegitimate 
use of force by the Houthis.114 
In a letter dated March 25, 2015, President Hadi officially 
invited intervention and the use of force in Yemen to restore 
peace.115  The letter read: 
The threat is therefore not only to the security of Yemen, but also 
to that of the entire region and to international peace and 
security . . . . The Houthi militias have committed several acts of 
aggression, most recently deploying military columns to attack 
and take control of Aden and the rest of the south . . . . I therefore 
appeal to you, and to the allied States that you represent, to stand 
by the Yemeni people as you have always done and come to the 
country’s aid.  I urge you, in accordance with the right of self-
defence set forth in Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, and with the Charter of the League of Arab States and 
the Treaty on Joint Defence, to provide immediate support in 
every form and take the necessary measures, including military 
intervention, to protect Yemen and its people from the ongoing 
Houthi aggression, repel the attack that is expected at any moment 
on Aden and the other cities of the South, and help Yemen to 
confront Al-Qaida and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.116 
 
Therefore, it is relevant to enquire about the legality of using 
force by invitation or consent of the host state, and then to evaluate 
whether the use of force by Saudi Arabia is aligned with the 
international law of using force. 
1. International Law on Consent/Intervention by 
Invitation 
Intervention by invitation is the use of force by a foreign state 
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in a host state under the legal authority of the host state.117  Such 
intervention is usually acted upon in aid of the legitimate 
government to maintain peace and order in the host state.118  First, 
consent by the highest acting official of the host state is required119 
to be able to identify any abuse of consent.  Second, the legitimacy 
of the consenting government must also be recognized by the 
international community.120  In this regard, recognition of the host 
government as a legitimate government by the UN is enough to 
establish the legitimacy of the consent by the acting government.121 
In the state practice under customary international law, consent 
or invitations by host states against military coups and secessionist 
groups have never been opposed by any states.122  Other cases of 
State practice have taken place, inter alia, in Afghanistan (beginning 
in 2001, UNSC Res. 1386 [2001]); the Middle East (Lebanon 1976–
90, Yemen 1978, Iraq since 2004 [UNSC Res. 1546 (2004)]); in 
Africa (Angola 1976–88, Ethiopia 1978, Sierra Leone 2000); in 
Southeast Asia (Laos 1975, Cambodia 1978, Timor-Leste 2006); in 
South Asia (Sikkim 1949, Nepal 1951 and 1953, Sri Lanka 1987–
90, Maldives 1988); within micro States (St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 1979, Vanuatu 1980, Trinidad and Tobago 1990, 
Solomon Islands 2003, Tonga 2006); and in Western Europe 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995, Macedonia 2001, Kosovo 2008).  
Taken together, these cases show that intervention by invitation of 
the government has been practised in all regions.123 
Moreover, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in the 
landmark Nicaragua124 case, set a general dictum and stated that: “it 
is difficult to see what would remain of the principle of non-
intervention in international law if intervention, which is already 
allowable at the request of the government of a State, were also to 
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be allowed at the request of the opposition.”125  Similarly, in the case 
of DRC v. Uganda,126 the ICJ established that intervention by 
invitation is “allowable at the request of the government.”127  In sum, 
intervention by invitation is legally permissible under international 
laws and doctrines of using force, which are endorsed by state 
practice, the practice of the UN Security Council (UNSC),128 the 
case law of the ICJ,129 and the definition of aggression by the UN 
General Assembly.130  Therefore, under customary international 
law, intervention by the invitation of the host state is seen as a third 
exception to the UN Charter’s prohibition on using force.131 
In the present case, it is clear that the Hadi government has been 
recognized as the legitimate government by the UN: Resolution 
2216 (2015) acknowledged President Hadi as the legitimate acting 
president of the government of Yemen.132  The UN has also 
acknowledged the letter of invitation by the highest official, 
President Hadi, to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen.133  Therefore, 
the UN unequivocally implies that the actions undertaken by the 
Saudi-led coalition do not violate the international law of using 
force, the law of nonintervention, or the prohibition on the use of 
force, because they are aligned with the customary laws of 
intervention by invitation endorsed by state practice,134 ICJ case 
law,135 and legal doctrines.136  On the other hand, the use of drones 
by the U.S. against suspected terrorists in the sovereign territory of 
Yemen has no legal basis in the international law of using force, 
since the Yemeni government has categorically refused the U.S. 
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permission to use force in its sovereign territory.137 
B. International Stance 
Most Arab nations and several Western countries have 
supported the actions of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen.  For 
example, the League of Arab States “fully welcome[d] and 
support[ed] the military operations in defence [sic] of legitimate 
authority in Yemen . . . by the coalition composed of the States 
members of the Gulf Cooperation Council and a number of Arab 
States” and emphasized that the operation was “grounded in the 
Arab Treaty of Joint Defense and Article 51 of the UN Charter.”138  
In the West, the United States has supported and acknowledged that 
the use of force by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition was authorized by 
the legitimate government of President Hadi.139  Similarly, the 
United Kingdom,140 France,141 and Canada142 have also endorsed and 
supported Saudi actions to restore peace and stability in the region. 
On the other side, international institutions and certain states 
preferred to take a neutral stance, reiterating that the peace, 
diplomatic, and political talks and negotiations are the only key to 
peace and stability in Yemen and the surrounding region.  For 
instance, the Secretary-General of the UN, Ban Ki-moon, stated that 
“negotiations remain the only option for ultimately resolving the 
Yemini crisis.”143  Similarly, EU representatives specified that 
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“military action is not a solution.  . . .  Only a broad political 
consensus through negotiations can provide a sustainable 
solution.”144  Likewise, China,145 Russia,146 and Oman147 have 
argued that political and peace dialogues are the only solution to the 
Yemeni crisis. 
However, a couple of countries have suggested that the 
intervention of Saudi Arabia has no legal basis in the international 
laws of using force.  For instance, Iran accused Saudi Arabia of 
violating Article 2(4) of the UN Charter,148 which prohibits the use 
of force in other countries.149  Similarly, Russia argued that the 
Saudi-led intervention in Yemen has no legal basis in the 
international laws of using force.150  Iraq took a somewhat similar 
stance and stated that there should be no interference in the internal 
matters of Yemen.151  Before the Saudi-led coalition intervention in 
Yemen, the UNSC declared that there should be no interference in 
Yemen’s internal affairs.152  However, after the Saudi intervention, 
the UNSC, in Resolution 2216 (2015), acknowledged the letter by 
President Hadi to the coalition to use force in Yemen.153  The 
resolution neither authorized nor denounced the Saudi intervention 
in Yemen.154 
 
Resolving Yemeni Crisis, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/16621 (Mar. 26, 2015). 
 144 EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERV., STATEMENT OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE 
AND VICE PRESIDENT FEDERICA MOGHERINI ON THE SITUATION IN YEMEN (2015). 
 145 MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF CHINA, FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESPERSON HUA 
CHUNYING’S REGULAR PRESS CONFERENCE ON MARCH 26, 2015 (2015). 
 146 See Ferro & Ruys, supra note 10. 
 147 Noah Browning, Interview-Yemen Combatants Not Ready for Talks, Says 
Neighbour Oman, REUTERS (Apr. 2, 2015, 1:48 PM), https://uk.reuters.com/article/yemen-
security-oman/interview-yemen-combatants-not-ready-for-talks-says-neighbour-oman-
idUKL6N0WZ3E720150402 [https://perma.cc/S6PY-RYE5]. 
 148 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
 149 See Ferro & Ruys, supra note 10. 
 150 See id. 
 151 Michael R. Gordon & Eric Schmitt, Tensions Flare Between Iraq and Saudi 
Arabia in U.S. Coalition, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/16/world/middleeast/iraqi-prime-minister-criticizes-
saudi-intervention-in-yemen.html [https://perma.cc/Q3GL-4XR9].  See also Ferro & 
Ruys, supra note 10, at 2. 
 152 S.C. Pres. Statement 2015/8 (Mar. 22, 2015). 
 153 S.C. Res. 2216 (Apr. 14, 2015). 
 154 See Ferro & Ruys, supra note 10. 
2020 THE CRISIS IN YEMEN 247 
V. Nature of the Conflict 
Every armed conflict can be categorized as an international or a 
non-international armed conflict under international humanitarian 
laws.  International armed conflicts are fought between two or more 
states.155  Non-international armed conflicts are fought between the 
armed forces of one or more states on one side, and nonstate actors 
on the other side.156  International and non-international armed 
conflicts may also coexist in certain complex conditions.157  
Moreover, a non-international armed conflict becomes an 
international armed conflict as a proxy war only if the nonstate party 
to the non-international armed conflict is controlled by a state.158 
A. Non-international Armed Conflict 
There are two major prerequisites for a non-international armed 
conflict: that there is an intensive hostility between the two parties159 
and that the nonstate party is well organized.160  The markers or 
indicators of intensive hostility include the duration and intensity of 
hostility, number of combatants, sophistication of weapons, number 
of casualties, extent of destruction, and the involvement of 
international bodies such as the UN,161 whereas the markers of an 
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organized nonstate party include the “presence of command 
structure in the non-state party, rules among them, existence of 
headquarters, control of territory, access to sophisticated weapons, 
military training, military operations, [and] ability to sign peace 
accords.”162 
In this context, the present armed conflict of the Saudi-led 
coalition acting on the directions of the Hadi government on one 
side, against the Houthi rebels on the other, can be characterized as 
a non-international armed conflict163 because the Houthis are 
considered an organized nonstate group164 that has gained control of 
the national capital and exiled the Hadi government.165  However, 
only if it can be proven that Iran is in control of the Houthis can it 
be possible for this armed conflict to be characterized as an 
international armed conflict.  Yet, as a matter of fact, Iran does not 
exercise any direct or proven control over the Houthis,166 so this 
conflict is not an international armed conflict. 
VI. Humanitarian Crisis 
Currently, Yemen is facing the “largest food insecurity 
emergency in the world.”167  Even before the war broke out, Yemen 
was reported to be one of the poorest countries in the world, 
dependent on international aid for a majority of its food supply.168  
Since the war broke out, the humanitarian crisis in Yemen has been 
dubbed by the UN as the worst and largest human crisis in the 
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world.169  The economy, health care system, infrastructure, rule of 
law, and governance in Yemen have been devastated.170  Alongside 
these issues, Yemen is suffering from outbreaks of deadly diseases, 
violence, poverty, and the displacement of its population.171  More 
than three million people are internally displaced within Yemen,172 
and more than 160,000 people have migrated to other countries as 
refugees.173  Saudi Arabia has received the most.174  Twenty million 
people need humanitarian aid and more than ten million people need 
food aid.175  Almost 10,000 innocent civilians have lost their lives 
in indiscriminate attacks.176  Thousands of those innocents have 
been small children.177  Approximately 20 people die every day from 
deadly diseases or from war wounds in Yemen.178  Additionally, 
there is widespread use of explosives, land mines, and cluster bombs 
in Yemen, and thousands of children have even been recruited to be 
used in fighting.179  In this war, more than 70 hospitals and 170 
schools have been targeted.180  There have also been indiscriminate 
attacks on 357 food farms, water infrastructure, markets, and 
stores.181  This destruction has resulted in $7 billion of economic 
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loss in damages, more than $7 billion of loss in production,182 and a 
37.5% decline in Yemen’s GDP.183 
Yemen lacks the resources to run its health care system,184 and 
it is running short of doctors, supplies, fuel, and medical 
equipment.185  Approximately two million people in Yemen do not 
have access to safe drinking water and sanitation facilities.186  As a 
result, there has been a cholera outbreak with 895,000 suspected 
cases, resulting in the deaths of more than 2,200 people.187  Millions 
of children and migrants have been declared at risk of cholera, 
measles, and malnutrition.188  Yemen’s food supply is 90% reliant 
on imports; since the occupation and seizure of the Hodeidah port, 
the food crisis in Yemen is at a record high189 causing sky-high food 
prices,190 which makes food unaffordable for the general public.191 
A. Applicable Laws on Humanitarian Aid  
Article 14 of Additional Protocol (AP) II of the Geneva 
Conventions192 prohibits the parties of a conflict from employing 
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starvation as a military tactic and characterizes the targeting of 
objects that are indispensable for human life, such as the water 
system,193 a war crime194 and a crime against humanity.195  Denying 
access to food, water, and health care also violates human rights 
laws.196  Humanitarian law allows neutral parties to be able to 
provide humanitarian assistance during an armed conflict,197 most 
particularly food and medical relief.198  Under customary 
international law, it is the duty of the parties to a conflict to allow 
passage to this humanitarian aid.199  Since the coalition is acting with 
the consent and authority of the Yemeni government, it is the Hadi 
government’s responsibility to ensure that the humanitarian law of 
respecting humanitarian aid is followed by the coalition and its own 
government.200 
B. Obstruction of Humanitarian Aid 
Both parties to the conflict, the Houthis and the Saudi-led 
coalition, are responsible for hindering humanitarian aid from 
reaching civilian populations.201  The International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) has claimed that approximately 20 million 
civilians living in Yemen are in dire need of humanitarian aid, 
labeling this crisis the worst humanitarian crisis in the world.202  The 
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Saudi-led coalition has imposed a blockade on land, sea, and air 
routes to Yemen to be able to fight the Houthis.203  This blockade 
has prevented the transfer of food, medicine, and fuel to the country, 
whose economy relies 80–90% on imports.204  Since then, the health, 
food, and water systems of Yemen have collapsed, unleashing a 
cholera outbreak.205  By 2017, the number of people affected by 
cholera in Yemen were counted in the millions.206  These health 
conditions are primarily caused by the blockade imposed by the 
Saudi-led coalition.207  By the end of 2017, the coalition reinforced 
and strengthened this blockade in response to a missile attack by 
Houthis targeting an international airport in Saudi Arabia.208  Within 
a month, however, the coalition allowed humanitarian 
consignments to pass through.209  While NGOs are advocating 
lifting the blockade completely,210 this action would also translate 
into opening arms support and material support for the Houthis, 
which has catastrophically devastated an entire country through 
rebellion, coup, and the illegitimate use of force.211  The blockade 
by the coalition is legally backed by UNSC Resolution 2216 
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(2015).212  The coalition argues that the blockade is to implement 
the arms embargo against the Houthis.213  It is pertinent to note here 
that the same resolution advocated and supported the transfer of 
humanitarian aid to Yemen.214  For these reasons, if the coalition 
blocks any humanitarian aid to Yemen without any reasonable 
grounds, then it will be acting without any legitimate grounds under 
international law.215  On the other side, the Houthis have deliberately 
targeted humanitarian aid to stop it from reaching the civilian 
population.216  They are even responsible for detaining, torturing, 
and killing members of the humanitarian workforce.217  Given the 
severity of the humanitarian crisis due to food shortage and 
outbreaks of deadly diseases, UNSC Resolution 2417 (2018) urged 
the international community to investigate the causes of this 
humanitarian crisis and hold accountable those responsible.218 
VII. Laws Applicable to the Yemeni Conflict 
The law dictates that the people responsible for violating any 
human rights or international humanitarian law must be held 
accountable for their crimes.219  Human rights law requires the 
investigation of the arbitrary deprivation of life and other 
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indispensable human rights, such as the right to a fair trial, which 
should be undertaken by the international standards of transparency 
and impartiality.220  International humanitarian law requires all 
states to hold those people accountable who are responsible for war 
crimes.221 
A. Human Rights Law 
Furthermore, in addition to international humanitarian law, 
human rights law is also222 applicable to non-international armed 
conflicts.223  This law includes the right to life; a prohibition on 
indiscriminate attacks; a prohibition on the arbitrary deprivation of 
life; economic, cultural, and social rights; the right to drinking 
water; and a right to housing.224  These rights should be respected 
by the parties to a non-international armed conflict.225 
1. Violations of Human Rights Law 
The indiscriminate attacks against civilian hospitals, civilian 
buildings, civilian markets, and hotels amount to war crimes.226  
Under human rights law, civilian casualties caused by such 
indiscriminate attacks violate the proscription of the arbitrary 
deprivation of life.227  Attacks on food markets and water facilities 
violate the right to food and water,228 while indiscriminate attacks 
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on civilian residential areas violate the right to adequate housing for 
civilians.229  Likewise, attacks on medical facilities such as hospitals 
amount to a violation of civilians’ right to health care.230 
B. International Humanitarian Law 
Yemen and the Saud-led coalition are parties to the Geneva 
Conventions (GCs),231 and the common Article 3 of the GCs and AP 
II232 is applicable to non-international armed conflicts.  On the other 
side, since the Houthis meet all the requirements set out by Article 
1 of AP II,233 the treaty laws are applicable to them.  In addition, the 
laws of AP I234 and the customary humanitarian laws are also 
applicable to both parties to a non-international armed conflict.235  
Below are certain international humanitarian principles that have 
acquired the status of customary international law, enabling their 
applicability to all states and parties to a conflict.236 
1. Principle of Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality mandates that the loss and harm 
caused by a military operation must not be in excess to the military 
gains acquired by it.237  This principle precludes attacks “which may 
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
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military advantage anticipated.”238  This means that the collateral 
damage caused by a military operation should not be 
disproportionate to the expected military gain.  The assessment 
considering the gains and losses by a military operation is subjective 
in nature, and it can be evaluated by applying its rules to a case.239  
However, it still assesses the subjective understanding of a 
reasonable commander while executing the military operation. 
2. Principle of Distinction 
The principle of distinction states that “the Parties to the conflict 
shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and 
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and 
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military 
objectives.”240  Civilians can only be targeted as combatants if they 
choose to take direct part in hostilities, at which point they lose their 
protection from war that they acquired from the principle of 
distinction.241  The principle dictates that, during an armed conflict, 
civilian objects such as hospitals, schools, civilian buildings, and 
houses cannot be directly targeted, unless they are used for military 
or hostile purposes.242  Likewise, indiscriminate attacks on civilians 
and civilians objects are also proscribed by this principle.243  Attacks 
that do not differentiate between civilian and military targets are 
called indiscriminate attacks.244  Military tactics of targeting water 
supplies, food supplies, and other things indispensable for civilians’ 
survival are also proscribed by this principle.245  Similarly, taking 
civilian hostages and using civilians as human shields are acts 
prohibited by international humanitarian law.246 
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3. Principle of Precaution 
The principle of precaution states that “[i]n the conduct of 
military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian 
population, civilians and civilian objects.”247  Therefore, all parties 
to a conflict must assure that, at all times while using force, the 
target is indeed a military target, and that, by the use of weapons of 
choice, the harm to civilians is minimized.248  Under the principle of 
precaution, an attack or target must be aborted if it is known that the 
target is civilian and not military in nature, and that the harm to 
civilians will be disproportionate to the military gains anticipated.249  
Accordingly, if a situation allows, a warning to the civilian 
population should be given in advance.250  While international 
humanitarian law acknowledges that casualties, injuries, and harm 
to civilians is unavoidable during the course of war, it stipulates that 
military actions should be planned and undertaken in such a fashion 
that harm to civilians is minimized.251  For this reason, international 
humanitarian law dictates that the weapon of choice should not 
create unnecessary suffering for civilians, nature, or the 
environment.252  Therefore, the use of chemical bombs, cluster 
munitions, biological weapons, blinding lasers, and incendiary 
weapons is proscribed by law.253 
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4. Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
The Panel of Experts assembled to review the attacks of 2017 
concluded that the conduct of both parties—the Saudi-led coalition 
and the Houthis—violated international humanitarian and human 
rights law.254  The Panel added that both parties had violated the 
prohibition on indiscriminate and disproportionate255 attacks by 
using explosive materials and ammunition in civilian populated 
areas.256 
i. Conduct of the Houthis 
The Panel of Experts analyzed the Houthis’ use of ammunition 
and explosive materials in civilian residential areas of Taizz.  Most 
particularly, it evaluated the humanitarian ramifications of an attack 
by the Houthis that killed 27 civilians.257  The Panel concluded that: 
(1) the harm done to civilians suggests that the principle of 
precaution was not respected; (2) there was no evidence that the 
targeted civilians had taken part in hostilities; and (3) the harm done 
to civilians was disproportionate to the military gains.258  The Panel 
found that the attacks by the Houthis were indiscriminate in nature 
because they specifically targeted civilian residential areas, while 
deliberately intending to destroy civilian housing.259  In other 
instances, the Houthis violated the prohibition on indiscriminate 
attacks by targeting residential buildings and hospitals.260  The 
Houthis also violated other international humanitarian laws by using 
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prohibited landmines261 and using proscribed262 child soldiers.263 
ii. Conduct of the Saudi-Led Coalition 
The Panel particularly discussed ten airstrikes by the Saudi-led 
coalition.264  These strikes targeted civilian buildings, civilian 
vehicles, a civilian marketplace, a civilian hotel, and government 
buildings.265  These strikes resulted in 157 casualties and 135 
injuries, of whom 85 were underage children.266  The Panel 
concluded that these attacks violated international humanitarian 
law.267  However, this conclusion was reached on the premise that 
no evidence supported the Saudi claims that the attacks were 
undertaken as military targets.268  The Panel cited four reasons for 
finding the violation: (1) there was no concrete evidence to prove 
the claim that the targeted civilians had taken part in hostilities, 
therefore they had no protection; (2) the weapon of choice was 
precision-guided missiles and, therefore, it can be rightly assumed 
that the targets hit were the targets intended; (3) the harm done to 
civilians, including 85 children who lost their lives, proves that 
precaution was not taken while undertaking the attacks; and (4) if 
the attacked targets had indeed been military targets, then the harm 
done to the civilians was disproportionate to the military gain.269  
Similarly, other reports by the UN and NGOs also concluded that 
the attacks by the Saudi-led coalition violated international 
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humanitarian law, particularly through their targeting of civilian 
markets, hospitals, and civilian buildings.270  Committees for the 
protection of women and children also iterated that the Saudi-led 
coalition must respect the principles of proportionality, precaution, 
and distinction in their armed attacks.271 
C. Transfer of Arms 
There is global outcry over the arms transfer by the West to the 
Saudi-led coalition for use in the armed conflict in Yemen against 
the Houthis.272  NGOs in the UK273 and Italy274 have initiated cases 
in domestic courts to stop arms supplies to the coalition on the basis 
that the coalition was responsible for violating International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) in Yemen.275  However, this Article is not 
concerned with arms supplies to the coalition, as the coalition is 
using legitimate force in Yemen with the authority of the Yemeni 
government,276 which is facing a serious humanitarian crisis and 
armed conflict against Houthi rebels with no arms embargo. 
The point of concern here is that the arms supplied to the 
Houthis, who are nonstate actors, are being used in unlawful force 
against the government and people of Yemen.  In a true sense, the 
Houthis are responsible for the Yemeni crisis.  The landmark 
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Nicaragua case established that providing arms support to nonstate 
actors is not only prohibited under international law, but tantamount 
to aggression and the use of force.277 
The international media has accused Iran of supplying arms to 
the Houthis.  In fact, the UN has acknowledged that Iranian 
weapons are indirectly supplied to Houthi rebels278 because the 
technology used by Houthi missiles is similar to those manufactured 
in Iran, if not identical.279  The Iranian government has categorically 
denied involvement in the Yemeni conflict.280  Therefore, it is 
disputable whether Iran is responsible for supporting the Houthis.  
If the categorization of identifying the manufacturers of weapons 
leads to blame for supporting the Houthis, it is interesting to note 
that most of the weapons used by the Houthis are manufactured by 
the U.S.281  Therefore, it can be argued that the U.S. is indirectly 
supporting the Houthis in Yemen.  The media and the West have 
accused the coalition of supplying U.S.-manufactured weapons to 
the Houthis.282  But it seems highly illogical and paradoxical for the 
representatives of the coalition to empower actors who pose a great 
threat to Saudi Arabia and who occasionally fire missiles into the 
territory of Saudi Arabian populated cities.283 
D. Arbitrary Detention 
Both international humanitarian law and human rights law 
prohibit arbitrary detention and stipulate that people have the right 
to not be arbitrarily deprived of their liberty.284  In addition, 
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customary international law, the common Article 3 of GCs, Article 
4 of AP II, and human rights law285 also require that the detainees286 
be treated humanely287 and not be subject to torture288 or ill-
treatment.289  Upon allegations of violations of these laws, parties to 
a conflict are responsible for investigating them.290  The Panel of 
Experts has accused the UAE, the Houthis, and Yemen’s 
government of violating these laws.291  However, Yemen’s 
government and the UAE government have not investigated these 
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cases yet.292 
The UAE runs three detention facilities located in Mukalla, 
Aden, and Balhalf.  The Panel of Experts found that the UAE acted 
in violation of international humanitarian and human rights law in 
regard to the captured detainees in these centers.293  More 
specifically, the Panel acknowledged that the UAE Elite forces 
acted under the authority of Yemen’s government,294 and accused it 
of violating IHL and human rights law on 12 counts by arbitrarily 
arresting, torturing, and not providing medical treatment to the 
captured Al Qaeda members detained in Mukalla.295  The Panel also 
accused Yemen’s government of the same violations on account of 
23 persons detained in Aden, Ma’rib, and Lahij.296  Similarly, the 
Panel concluded that the Houthis were responsible for violating 
humanitarian and human rights law regarding arbitrary detention 
and torture.297 
E. Counterterror 
The U.S. has conducted air and drone strikes in different regions 
of Yemen against Al Qaeda and other suspected terrorists since 
Saleh’s era.298  In 2017 alone, the U.S. launched 131 airstrikes 
against Yemen.299  In 2018, the numbers came down to 31.300  The 
Yemeni government rejected U.S. authority to use drone strikes in 
Yemen’s sovereign territory.301  In response, the UN acknowledged 
that the drone strikes by the U.S. did not adhere to the principles of 
IHL.302  In 2017, the Hadi government again formally asked the U.S. 
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government to stop its use of force via drone strikes against 
suspected terrorists in the sovereign territory of Yemen.303  The use 
of drones by the U.S. against suspected terrorists in Yemen has no 
legal basis in international law, since the Yemeni government has 
categorically refused the U.S.’s request to use force in its sovereign 
territories.304 
Although the U.S. drone strikes in Yemen have killed Al Qaeda 
and ISIS members, they have also killed many civilians in Yemen 
as collateral damage.305  Scholars have viewed these strikes as the 
prime motivator of increasing extremism in Yemen, because it 
furthers the cause of Al Qaeda and other extremist groups working 
in the region.306  According to reports, U.S. drone strikes have killed 
innocent tribesmen, as a result of poor intelligence and execution of 
the strikes.307  Thus, overall, these drone strikes have served to 
increase the support for and benefit to Houthis in the longer run, by 
spreading anti-U.S. sentiment among the general public.308  The 
U.S. has now used force via drone strikes in Yemen for at least 17 
years, resulting in the deaths of thousands of people, with an 
average of about 100 people per year.309  These strikes are highly 
disproportionate and indiscriminate in nature, undertaken without 
any precaution.310  For instance, in pursuit of one person, Qassim Al 
Rimi of Al Qaeda, the U.S. launched several unsuccessful drone 
strikes, killing more than 66 innocent people, of whom 31 were 
children.311  Therefore, according to UN reports, the U.S. 
counterterrorist activities in Yemen violate the international law of 
using force, international humanitarian law, and human rights 
law.312 
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VIII. Conclusion 
Since an intervention with the consent of the host state is 
permissible,313 the use of force by the Saudi coalition, with the 
permission of the Hadi government314 against the Houthis, is 
legitimate.315  Whereas the Houthis agression against Yemen and 
Saudi Arabia is considered impermissible in accordance with 
international laws. Similarly, the use of force by the U.S. against 
suspected terrorists in the sovereign territory of Yemen has no legal 
basis in international law because the Yemeni government has 
unconditionally refused allowing the U.S. to use force in its 
sovereign territory.316  The nature of the Saudi Coalition’s 
intervention in Yemen, however, is non-international since it is not 
concretely evidenced that the Houthis (non-state actors) are backed 
and controlled by any other state, or by Iran.317  It has been 
concluded, therefore, that the missile technology used by the 
Houthis against the sovereign territories of Saudi Arabia318 was 
indeed either manufactured in Iran or, at least, was similar to Iranian 
technology,319 and the weapons and arms used by the Houthis are 
mainly manufactured by the U.S.320  Yet Iran categorically denies 
any kind of support to the Houthi rebels.321  Therefore, both human 
rights laws and international humanitarian laws are applicable to 
this Saudi-Houthi conflict.  While the anti-terrorist U.S activities in 
Yemen, without Yemeni consent, can be considered an international 
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conflict, only humanitarian laws are applicable to the conduct. 
Under the Saudi-Houthi conflict, both parties have violated 
human rights laws pertaining to the right to life, adequate housing, 
food,322 water, and healthcare323 through their indiscriminate attacks 
on hospitals, buildings,324 markets, and hotels.325  Likewise, the 
Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis have also violated international 
humanitarian laws.  They have violated the prohibition on 
conducting indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks326 by using 
explosive materials and ammunitions in civilian populated areas 
that caused casualties of numerous innocent people.327  The Houthis, 
for example, have launched indiscriminate attacks on civilian 
residential areas (including buildings and hospitals),328 deliberately 
intending to destroy civilian housing.329  They violated the 
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prohibitions330 on the use of landmines,331 child soldiers,332 arbitrary 
detention, and torture.333  Similarly, the Saudi-led coalition also 
targeted civilian buildings, civilian vehicles, civilian marketplaces, 
civilian hotels, and government buildings,334  resulting in 157 
casualties and 135 injuries, of whom 85 were children.335  Therefore, 
Saudi actions can be dubbed as disproportionate to their military 
gains.336 
Furthermore, the U.S.’s indiscriminate337 counter-terrorism 
attacks in Yemen are the prime motivator of increasing extremism 
in Yemen because they further the cause of Al Qaeda and other 
extremist groups working in the region.338  The U.S. has been using 
force in Yemen for 17 years, which has resulted in thousands of 
casualties of innocent people.339  These attacks are highly 
disproportionate and indiscriminate in nature, and they are 
undertaken without any precaution.340  Therefore, the U.S. 
counterterrorist activities in Yemen341 and the Houthis aggression 
against Saudi Arabia and Yemen violate international laws 
concerning the use of force.  Correspondingly, the conduct of the 
Houthis, the U.S., and the Saudi Coalition also violate several 
international humanitarian laws and human rights laws. 
The humanitarian crisis in Yemen will only deteriorate if the 
world does not intervene to right the wrongs that the Houthis have 
committed, including but not limited to, orchestrating rebellions, 
destabilizing the region, attacking other sovereign states, 
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overthrowing the Yemeni government, and killing innocent people.  
A just cause in this situation is to help Yemen’s lawful government 
and the Saudi Coalition to get rid of the Houthi threat to peace and 
security.  Therefore, all of the arms transfers, financial assistance, 
and training provided to Houthis by any state must be faced with 
strict actions from the United Nations Security Council.  On the 
other hand, the U.S. does not have any just cause for using force in 
Yemen.  The international community should put a stop to U.S. 
interventions in other countries on false pretenses, like fighting 
terrorism.  Contrarily, host states must be assisted with arms, 
finances, and training to be able to fight terrorism and detect 
rebellions to end revolutions at early stages.  For instance, in 
Yemen, the U.S. should not be independently fighting ISIS.  
Instead, the U.S. should help Yemen’s government fight terrorists 
and Houthi rebels if it truly intends to eradicate terrorism.  
Nevertheless, the perpetrators of war crimes in Yemen, be it from 
Houthis or the Saudi Coalition, must be held accountable for their 
atrocities against innocent people, so that peace in the region is 
restored and the humanitarian exigencies are respected in the future. 
 
 
